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CARETAKING AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF
CONTEMPORARY POLICY
Michael Selmi and Naomi Cahn*
1. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary social policy relating to women's employment remains strik-
ingly ambivalent. Those in favor of traditional family structures, a position that is
generally associated with conservative political agendas, have often expressed a
preference for a family model that emphasizes the woman's role as a homemaker,
or to use the more recent term, a caretaker. At the same time, as the 1996 Welfare
Reform Act demonstrates, if the choice is between providing financial support that
would enable lower-incom6 women to stay in the home and forcing those women
into the labor market, the conservative agenda will opt for the latter. More re-
cently, and as an adjunct to the continuing welfare reform, policy makers on the
right have advocated policies intended to promote marriage as a means of reduc-
ing poverty and providing for a more stable home for children. In some ways,
these marriage promotion policies can be seen as a substitute for employment and
as a way of striking a balance between the competing goals entangled in the wel-
fare debate.
Although these specific marriage proposals are of recent vintage, the objec-
tives on the right, of promoting traditional families while deemphasizing women's
role in the labor market, are familiar and long-standing. What has been more
surprising is the convergence of policy objectives with the developing interest on
the left of support for women's caretaking roles with public subsidies. In the last
several years, there has been a veritable explosion of books and articles emphasiz-
ing women's role as caretakers and the difficulties women have balancing their
roles as mothers and paid wage earners. As a way of ensuring a better balance
between what are typically seen as two distinct roles, this literature suggests that it
would be a desirable social policy to facilitate women's caretaking, through more
extended parental leave, nonmarginalized part-time work, and by placing a greater
social value on caretaking. 1 These proposals, however, would likely have a seri-
ous negative effect on the quest for greater equality for women, particularly in the
workplace, and they are likely to produce a replay of the debate over "difference"
feminism from the 1980s by identifying women as caretakers and by appearing to
accept gendered differences. Just as is true of the marriage proposals on the right,
these policy suggestions might signal a return to the past rather than a move for-
ward for women.
* Professors, George Washington University Law School. We thank Jennifer Wriggins for
organizing this thought-provoking symposium, and the other participants for their comments, in
particular Kate Silbaugh who provided detailed critical comments on an earlier draft. Although
we should be clear that she disagreed with much of our analysis, we benefited substantially
from her critical insights. We would also like to thank Todd Melnick for his library assistance
and George Washington University Law School, and Dean Michael Young, for their extensive
support that has allowed us the time and space necessary to attain a balance between our work
and family demands.
1. These issues are discussed in more detail infra Part III.
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The right's marriage proposals and the left's carework proposals nonetheless
appear to focus on different aspects of women's roles. As the left recognizes,
women can be mothers without being wives and support for caretaking is an un-
questionably important social goal, which the left acknowledges through its advo-
cacy of public responsibility for caretaking. The right, on the other hand, is at-
tempting to force mothers to be wives while continuing to devalue the caretaking
done by poor women by decreasing public support for caretaking. The proposals
do, however, have a similar effect; each set of proposals can be seen as reinforcing,
and in some ways reifying, women's role within the home.
While we support the goal of providing increased recognition to the value of
caretaking, we contend that this revaluation should be achieved without diminish-
ing the role of women in the workplace. First, we challenge the view that marriage
provides a cure for welfare dependence. Second, we argue that in addition to
stressing the importance of caretaking, the left should focus on other issues that
affect women's equality, such as education, the timing and length of the school
calendar, and continued workplace discrimination.
It is important to recognize that much of the carework literature does, of course,
challenge the gendered nature of the workplace and in this essay we are challeng-
ing one aspect of the literature, that which focuses on facilitating women's
carework. 2 Our goal is to change the gendered female character of carework;
although we approach the issue from outside of the home, we also seek to facilitate
men's performance of household work and women's performance of market work.
H. MARRIAGE AND WELFARE REFORM
Congress and the executive branch are currently considering a series of pro-
marriage proposals as a purported means of improving the public welfare system.
While this essay does not discuss these proposals in great detail, it explains some
of them in an attempt to illustrate their intent and potential impact. For example,
proposed legislation would change the purpose of TANF so that it explicitly en-
courages the formation of "married" families and would also provide $100 million
over five years for state programs to promote married two-parent families.3 Simi-
larly, President Bush has also supported spending millions of dollars to promote
2. In discussing the carework literature, we are painting with a broad brush, and we do not
mean to group all carework literature together. As noted in the text, our analysis in this paper
focuses on some of the more popular manifestations of a complex literature, and there are many
other examinations of carework that are either more sensitive to the issues that we discuss or
which deal with distinctly different issues. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Class and Care: The Roles of
Private Intermediaries in the In-Home Industry in the United States and Israel, 24 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 89 (2001) (analyzing role of immigrant women in caretaking); Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiri-
tual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997) (discussing role of race and
gender in care work); Katherine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9
YALE J.L. & FEMINiSM 81 (1997) (exploring the economics of household labor and the impor-
tance of treating carework as a commodity). We also do not mean to dichotomize carework and
marketwork literature so as to repeat the feminist debates in the 1970s and 1980s over women's
sameness and difference to men. Our point is that we need both carework and workplace re-
form, and that we cannot focus on one without the other. The carework authors we discuss in
this paper seem to accept women's role as primary caretaker, even though some of their policy
proposals appear to state the contrary.
3. H.R. 4737, 107th Cong. §§ 101, 103 (2002) (discussed in LEVIN-EPSTEIN ET AL., infra note
22, at 4-5, 7).
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marriage as part of welfare reform.4 These marriage promotion activities are de-
signed to reduce the number of children born to single parents in order to decrease
welfare dependence and promote child welfare. 5 In this essay, our focus is not on
the relationship between marriage promotion and welfare reform, but instead on
how marriage promotion activities marginalize working women with children be-
cause they change the focus from the workplace to the family, and from systemic
problems faced by women to individual blame.
Historically, the promotion of marriage has served political and cultural ends
designed to reinforce the primacy of heterosexual marriages, with the man in the
role as the breadwinner. Underlying its language of companionship, marriage is a
public status that has historically been subjected to regulation designed to serve
the interests of the state.6 In her examination of the institution of marriage, Profes-
sor Nancy Cott shows how marriage has traditionally promoted a political agenda.
She observes that the federal government manipulated notions of citizenship dur-
ing the nineteenth century based on a woman's marital status in order to form and
reinforce appropriate gender roles.7 Marriage also functioned as a training ground
for virtuous citizenship, molding immigrant families into the appropriate father-
headed household, much in the same way that contemporary efforts to promote
marriage seek to transform the family.8 The contemporary efforts have striking
historical parallels with Congressional efforts to promote marriage in the late nine-
teenth century through birth control laws, as well as in the Freedmen's Bureau's
emphasis on legitimizing the marriages of freed slaves to ensure conformity to the
existing model of the nuclear family.9
4. See Robin Toner, Sort of Deserving: Helping the Poor in the Post-Welfare Era, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at 4-1; Editorial, Bush's Family Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 4, 2002, at A14;
see generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The Critique of Fed-
eral Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112 (1999); M.M. Slaughter, Fantasies:
Single Mothers and Welfare Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2156 (1995) (reviewing MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES (1995)).
5. See THEODORA OOMS, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, MARRIAGE-PLUS (2002), at
www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1023290035.07/marrige-plus.pdf. Ooms also points out that
liberals are worried that marriage promotion activities have the hidden agenda of returning women
to the kitchen.
6. See generally Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics,
and the Law of Marriage in the United States, 1860-1920, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 541 (1998).
7. Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934, 103
AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1442 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Jennifer Wriggins, Maine's "Act to Protect Traditional Marriage and Prohibit
Same-Sex Marriages": Questions of Constitutionality Under State and Federal Law, 50 ME. L.
REV. 345 (1998); Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997); Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and
Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage: Two are Better Than One, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. For
purposes of this paper, we are not even discussing problems with the federal statutory definition
of marriage in the Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
9. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 83-94 (2000);
Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American
Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 307-09 (1999) (noting that the right to marriage for
African-Americans in the post-Civil War era was of mixed benefit; while it allowed blacks
access to an institution, the state nonetheless used that institution to punish nonconformers).
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Marriage also serves to privatize dependence. 10 Judges and legislatures have
used marriage as a means to foster women's dependence on men rather than on the
state. 11 By finding a marriage where evidence was doubtful as to its existence,
judges made men, not the state, responsible. Historically, doctrines of common
law marriage and putative spousehood have recognized marriages based on the
parties' expectations and actions, notwithstanding a lack of compliance with the
requisite formalities. 12 These doctrines created marriages where there had been
no wedding ceremony, or where there was another impediment (such as the exist-
ence of another spouse); they have also, however, provided financial protection to
women who would otherwise be left without support upon the death or desertion
of the male breadwinner, 13 transferring financial dependence from public welfare
to private individuals.
There are a series of more practical problems embedded in the contemporary
welfare reform marriage proposals. First, although marriage per se does not de-
crease the number of hours that women work (or the percentage who work), mar-
ried women with children work less, and are less likely to work, than unmarried
women with children. 14 Thus, the combination of child care and marriage results
in decreased workforce participation by women. Proposals to encourage marriage
will, consequently, result in fewer working women. As Rhona Mahony points out
in her book, Kidding Ourselves, girls begin, at an early age, and long before they
actually find a partner, to make decisions with respect to education and work that
reflect the intense but often implicit social pressure to marry. 15 In college, women
face a strong peer culture that often values sexual attractiveness over intellectual
accomplishments, and that encourages women to temper their career aspirations. 16
Many women who work tend to specialize in female occupations that are lower-
paying than male occupations, notwithstanding comparable college graduation
10. See generally Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History ofActing Married, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 957 (2000); Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Com-
mon Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709 (1996).
11. Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the
Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1919-20 (1998); Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a
Fit Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics, and the Law of Marriage in the United States, 1860-1920,
23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 541, 578-80 (1998).
12. See generally Dubler, supra note 11.
13. E.g., Bowman, supra note 10, at 12-15; Lindsay, supra note 6, at 546-53.
14. Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women's Wages, AM. Soc. REV., Apr. 1997, at
209, 209; Michelle Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, AM. Soc. REV.,
Apr. 2001, at 204, 204.
15. RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING POWER 67-
71 (1995). Law and economics scholars, as well as their critics, have looked at the family to
examine the alleged logic of role differentiation. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, Husbands, Wives,
and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit, 31 FAM. L.Q. 119 (1997).
16. DOROTHY C. HOLLAND & MARGARETA. EISENHART, EDUCATED IN ROMANCE: WOMEN, ACHIEVE-
MENT, AND COLLEGE CULTURE 8,223-24 (1990).
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rates. 17 Middle-class women acquiesce, or "choose," 18 or negotiate this lifestyle,
sometimes consciously, sometimes not; the marriage proposals force poor women
to make these choices.
In addition, marriages have a high failure rate; between 40-50% of all couples
divorce, and the highest rates of divorce occur among younger couples. 19 Finan-
cial provisions upon divorce are inadequate; women's and children's standard of
living decrease dramatically upon divorce.20 There is an interesting correlation
between women's economic independence and an increasing divorce rate; priva-
tizing women's dependence on men rather than on the state might in fact decrease
the divorce rate, but at great expense to women's rights. In contrast to the divorce
rates, the unemployment rate, even among single mothers, is well below 40%.21
Education, training, and jobs provide more stable protection against poverty than
does the simple fact of marriage.
Indeed, notwithstanding the marriage promotion efforts in contemporary wel-
fare law, two-parent families are still treated more harshly than single parent fami-
lies in a variety of ways, such as work participation requirements. 2 2 While states
are permitted to adopt the same eligibility requirements for single parent and two-
17. Kristin McCue & Manuelita Ureta, Women in the Workplace: Recent Economic Trends, 4
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 125, 149-151 (1995). "
18. Choice is obviously a problematic concept. See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurispru-
dence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1193 n.140 (1998). Professor Carol
Rose has shown how the perception that women are more likely than men to cooperate results in
limiting women's possibilities for economic advancement. Carol M. Rose, Women and Prop-
erty: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 442 (1992). Once women "choose" to
cooperate in marital relationships, they find themselves in situations that encourage more "co-
operation," in which women become the person primarily responsible for maintaining the house-
hold. Id. at 431. Rather than "face a scene" when she asks her husband to perform household
work, a woman often will simply acquiesce, and there will be a cumulative and disadvantaging
effect on her. Id. at 440-41. Professor Rose suggests that women use their alleged taste for
cooperation to their own advantage, cooperating with others who will help them, and learning"selective noncooperation." Id. at 456-57.
19. See MATTHEW D. BRAMLETT, PH.D. & WILLIAM D. MOSHER, PH.D., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FIRST MARRIAGE DISSOLU-
TION, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE: UNITED STATES 5, available at www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/
ad323.pdf ("If the wife was a teenager at first marriage, the marriage is much more likely to
dissolve than if the wife was at least 20 years of age at marriage.").
20. E.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 19-27
(1994); Theodora Ooms, The Role of the Federal Government in Strengthening Marriage, 9 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 163, 182 (2001) (discussing public welfare provisions as they affect the two-
parent family).
21. As of October 2002, the official unemployment rate stood at 5.7%. See UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, TH4E EMPLOYMENT SITUATION tbl.A-1 (2002).
In 2001, the rate for unmarried women with children under eighteen was 8.0%. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS .OF FAMILIES
IN 2001, at tbl.5 (2002). The unemployment rate for single mothers may be misleading in that it
only includes those who are actively looking for work. A better indicator of the employment
situation of single women is their labor force participation rate, which in 2001 was 78.7%,
significantly higher than the rate for married mothers, which was 69.6%. See id.
22. JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN ET AL., CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, SPENDING Too MUCH,
ACCOMPLISHING Too LITTLE 7 (2002), at www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1023821143.64/
HR_4737_family-form-analysis_061102.pdf (on file with the Maine Law Review). Seventeen
states and the District of Columbia have differing eligibility criteria for the two kinds of fami-
lies. Id.
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parent families, a significant number have developed eligibility rules that make it
easier for single-parent families to receive assistance. 23
Finally, when two low-income people get married, we still have a low-income
family. While only 6% of married couples with children live in poverty,24 and
33% of single-mother headed households live in poverty,25 poverty and marriage
have a much more complex relationship than these stark figures indicate. Poor
women are less likely to get married than are non-poor women, and men who are
low earners are less likely to get married and more likely to get divorced than men
who have higher earnings. 26 Moreover, a decrease in wages for low-income men
results in a lower marriage rate. 27 In contrast, one study found that increasing the
income of poor working people increased their marriage rates. 28
The ongoing Fragile Families Study, which has examined approximately 5000
children and their parents in twenty cities has discovered some fascinating things
about unmarried parents-more than one-third of both men and women have less
than a high school education; almost all of the men worked in the year preceding
their child's birth; both mothers and fathers said that being able to spend time
together was a significant source of conflict; and while 90% of the women said
that having a husband with a steady job was important to a successful marriage,
50% of the men said that having a wife with a steady job was important to a suc-
cessful marriage.2 9 These statistics show that marriage promotion activities de-
pend on creating stable jobs; stable jobs, in turn, require education and training.30
In a careful study of the impact of welfare reform on family formation, re-
searchers analyzed seven of the major demonstration projects that had reported
findings on this particular issue.3 1 They found the data mixed: one program had
generated both increases and decreases in different locations; two other programs
resulted in increased marriage rates; while four programs had virtually no impact
on family formation. In an evaluation of one of the few programs to examine
whether welfare reform affects attitudes towards marriage, welfare recipients with
lower levels of education experienced increased desires for marriage, while those
23. Id.
24. STEPHANIE COONTZ & NANCY FOLBRE, COUNCIL ON CONTEMPORARY FAMILIES: MARRIAGE,
POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (2002), at www.contemporaryfamilies.org/briefing.html (on file
with the Maine Law Review) (citing Kathryn Edin, A Few Good Men: Why Poor Mothers Don't
Marry or Remarry, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 3, 2000, at 28).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Francine Blau et al., Understanding Young Women's Marriage Decisions, 53 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 624, 645 (2000); Robert A. Nakosteen & Michael A. Zimmer, Men, Money and
Marriage, 78 Soc. Sci. Q. 66 (1997).
28. OOMs, supra note 5 (discussing the Minnesta Family Investment Program).
29. SARA MCLANAHAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE FAMILIES AND CHILD WELLBEING STUDY BASELINE
REPORT tbls. 1, 2, at http://crcw.princeton.edu/fragilefamilies/nationalreport.pdf (on file with the
Maine Law Review).
30. See Sara A. McLanahan et al., Women's Roles and Women's Poverty, in GENDER AND
FAMILY CHANGE IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 258, 275 (Karen Oppenheim Mason & An-Magritt
Jensen eds., 1995) ("The only mothers who have a better-than-average chance of staying out of
poverty are [mothers] who combine parenthood and work with marriage.").
31. David J. Fein et al., Welfare Reform and Family Formation: Assessing the Effects; Jane
G. Mauldon et al., What Do They Think? Welfare Recipients' Attitudes Towards Marriage and
Childbearing (both available at www.abtassociates.com/wrffproject (last visited Nov. 27, 2002)).
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with higher levels of education experienced reduced expectations. 32 The researchers
concluded that marriage promotion activities per se are unlikely to result in an
increased marriage rate, 33 but that policies which make marriage "economically
feasible" may have an impact.34
While many critiques of marriage formation proposals focus on children, wel-
fare dependence, or on marital stability, our focus instead is on getting women into
the workplace and letting them stay there. Thus, while others have found that
forced marriage leads to domestic violence, 35-which, in and of itself is, of course,
deeply problematic-domestic violence in turn results in decreased workplace
performance as well as relationships that are bad for women and children. Domes-
tic violence has become an increasingly important issue in workplace reform as
well as in the public welfare debate. 36 While domestic violence occurs outside of
marriage as well as within marriage, marriage promotion activities may cause more
women to stay with men in violent relationships. 37
Moreover, marriage itself does not benefit children; extensive research has
shown, for example, that children in stepfamilies and children in single parent
families are at a comparable risk for decreased school performance and increased
juvenile delinquency, notwithstanding the existence of two parents married to each
other.38 Thus, marriage promotion may have undesirable effects regardless of its
effect on women's workplace performance.
Ultimately, however, the problem with marriage promotion activities is that
they change the focus from the systemic problem of women's inequality in the
workplace to individual women's decisions to marry.39 Marriage promotion ac-
tivities detract from the underlying causes of women's poverty: lack of education
and other resources. Rather than provide funds for women's full workplace par-
ticipation, marriage promotion activities provide funds for individual decisions to
reconstruct the traditional family, so that fathers will be responsible for breadwinning
and mothers for caretaking.
32. Fein, supra note 31, at 5; Mauldon, supra note 31, at 5.
33. Fein, supra note 31, at 7.
34. Id.
35. See e.g., Testimony of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund on "Welfare Reform and
Marriage Initiatives": Hearing on "Welfare Reform and Marriage Initiatives" Submitted to the
S. Fin. Comm., 107th Cong. 6-8 (2001) (statement of Jacqueline K. Payne, Policy Attorney, and
Sherry Leiwant, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).
36. Id. at 6-7.
37. Id.
38. SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS,
WHAT HELPS 44 tbl. 1, 120 fig. 15 (1994); JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND
REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (2000); NANCY DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES 4 (1997);
Katharine B. Silbaugh, Accounting for Family Change, 89 GEO. L.J. 923 (2001) (reviewing JUNE
CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (2000)); Naomi
Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225 (1997) (reviewing NANCY E.
DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES and BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE
CULTURE (1997)).
39. See Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy or Resistance? The Misplaced Focus on Choice in the
Surrogacy and Abortion Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1369 (1992) (reviewing CARMEL
SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989)); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About
Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII
Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1840-43 (1990); Joan
Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559,
1594-96 (1991).
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III. THE LEFT'S TURN TO CARETAKING
Just as the right remains ambivalent about women's relationship to the labor
market-preferring them to remain at home unless the choice is between subsidiz-
ing their time at home and compelling them to work-the left expresses a parallel
ambivalence, one that has most recently been embedded in the interest over women's
role as caretakers. In the last several years, a rising chorus of authors, in and out of
law, academic and nonacademic alike, have urged greater societal attention to what
has been labeled care work, a term that is intended to break down the dichotomy
between care and work by fusing the antinomies. Although those who have fo-
cused on care work differ substantially in their emphases and approaches, much of
the literature addresses a question that has long been central to feminist thinking,
namely the devaluing of work that occurs outside of the paid labor market and the
difficulties women have in balancing their home and workplace demands. But the
new work also encompasses decades of prior research and seems distinct in that it
is largely borne out of a frustration with the lack of progress women have made
over the last several decades; in particular, how women continue to be primarily
responsible for caretaking despite their increased presence in the labor market and
notwithstanding the rhetorical pressures on men to share parenting.40 For most
women, the quest for equal parenting has proved elusive and, indeed, women con-
tinue to perform the majority of work in the home, while failing to obtain substan-
tial equality in the workplace in terms of wages, status, or power, much of which
can be traced to their caretaking responsibilities. In addition to the frustration over
the lack of progress toward equality, there is also a renewed interest in women's
role as caretakers in a way that seeks to diminish the importance of gaining work-
place equality by emphasizing the social importance, and the persistent devaluing,
of caretaking. It is this latter emphasis in the literature that we seek to address in
this essay.
Within law, Martha Fineman and Joan Williams have been at the forefront of
this new wave of scholarship by emphasizing the societal need to facilitate women's
duties as caretakers. Martha Fineman, for example, has urged greater public sub-
sidies for caretaking, 4 1 while Joan Williams has advocated restructuring the work-
place so as to minimize the existing workplace norms that have been developed
around men without substantial family responsibilities and by substituting dis-
tinctly different workplace norms that would acknowledge that workers have oth-
ers they need to care for.4 2 One of us has recently commented on both of these
40. Mary Becker nicely captures this sentiment when she writes:
Equal parenting has been a major item on the feminist agenda in the United States for
at least the last thirty years. It has not happened yet .... Perhaps an equal division of
carework might be possible in the future. Who can say? Even if it is, however, we
need alternative strategies for the short term, ways in which women's well being can
be improved and inequality lessened even though women continue to do most care-
taking work.
Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 93 (2002).
For a discussion of proposals placing more responsibility on men, see, for example, Michael
Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707 (2000).
41. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 230-33 (1995); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking
the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 13, 26 (1999).
42. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO
Do ABOUT IT 4 (2000); see also Joan Williams, "It's Snowing Down South": How to Help Moth-
ers andAvoid Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812, 817-18 (2002).
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authors, 43 and in this essay we will primarily turn our attention to other recent
works that have sought to reemphasize women's roles as caretakers as a way of
illustrating both the insights and the dangers of this new turn.
We also believe it is important to stress that our differences with the caretak-
ing literature are largely strategic in nature, as we share many of the same goals. In
particular, we strongly believe that caretaking should be valued more highly and
that we ought to devote more societal resources to the care of dependents, includ-
ing through publicly-financed daycare facilities, decoupling benefits from employ-
ment, and developing more flexible working conditions to enable those respon-
sible for caretaking to devote adequate time to their responsibilities. As should
become clear, our primary disagreement involves the exclusive focus on caretak-
ing as a means of furthering women's interests, as we believe women's interests
are likely to be furthered to a greater extent by providing better access and oppor-
tunities in the paid labor market, and that wage labor should not be seen as incom-
patible with women's caretaking responsibilities.
In her book, Care and Equality: Inventing a New Family Politics,4 4 Mona
Harrington seeks to devise what she defines as a liberal program that would assign
weight to care as a national value. She writes, "[t]he key idea for a new politics of
family care... is to add care to the pantheon of national social values."'45 Through
a series of anecdotes combined with references to academic research, Harrington
emphasizes how little support our society devotes to the family and how this lack
of national attention adversely affects women both in and out of the workplace in
ways that are by now quite familiar. Although the vast majority of women are now
working, they remain disproportionately responsible for the care of children and
elderly relatives-the latter of which is an often overlooked group of more than
twenty-two million individuals that is certain to increase over the next decade-
and the structure of work "severely compromises [women's] ability to provide a
reasonable amount of care for various family members."'4 6 Her response, borrow-
ing loosely from Martha Fineman, is to gain greater public recognition of the im-
portance of motherhood in a way that might enable them to become "equal partici-
pants in all of the country's affairs." 47
Like much of the work in this genre, Harrington vacillates between stressing
the importance of women's attachment to the home and to the workplace, perhaps
in part due to her stated belief that the current system "cannot yield both care and
equality," here defining equality as having a relation that is distinct from
caregiving. 48 And while her emphasis is plainly on the social value of care work,
43. See Michael Selmi, Care, Work, and the Road to Equality: A Commentary on Fineman
and Williams, 76 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 1557 (2001) (commenting on Martha Albertson Fineman,
Contract and Care, 76 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 1403 (2001) and Joan Williams, From Difference to
Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work, Gender as Tradition, 76 CInc.-KENT L. REV. 1441
(2001)). These articles were part of an excellent symposium issue edited by Katherine Silbaugh.
44. MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A NEW FAMILY POLITICS (1999).
45. Id. at 48.
46. Id. at 51. Harrington also uses an expansive definition of care that would include far
more than children or the elderly but would also encompass others who while not dependent on
women for care still require attention, which includes just about anyone in the household. Id. at
49-51.
47. Id. at 117.
48. Id. at 41.
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she ultimately desires to extend public support for caregiving so as to enable women
to choose how they want to structure their lives, and presumably to do so free from
the penalties that typically attach under the current societal regime that discounts
the value of care work.49 As will be discussed in more detail below, this move is
also characteristic of the genre but at the same time adds a utopian flavor to what is
an otherwise pragmatic approach, suggesting that women's decisions should be
free of the economic realities that often influence those decisions.
Ann Crittenden is more explicit in her emphasis on the importance of mother-
hood, and on accommodating the needs of mothers who want to spend time out of
the paid labor market. In her recent book entitled the Price of Motherhood she
seeks to calculate the costs of what she calls the "the mommy tax"-the cost levied
on women who care for their children or other dependents, a cost she places at
more than $1 million for college-educated women. 50 She also criticizes both the
lack of more and better part-time jobs, which she claims is "what many mothers
really want," and the way in which gender ideologies tend to harden in the home
after the birth of a child.5 1 Her policy recommendations seek to redesign work
around parental norms, including a year's paid leave, proportional benefits for
part-time work, child allowances, and adding unpaid household labor to the GDP.52
There are a number of other recent and similar works that stress the impor-
tance of women's role as caregivers but these two popular books exemplify the
themes of the emerging literature. 53 Not surprisingly, a number of feminist schol-
ars have critiqued the care work literature for its privileging of motherhood, and
others have suggested that there is an essentializing undercurrent to the literature
that closely resembles the "difference" school of feminism.54 We want to skirt
that debate, to the extent possible, so as to focus on what we believe is the inaccu-
rate empirical underpinning of the caretaking literature, as well as its misleading
nature. Our primary critique is that the focus on care work is misleading in ways
that ultimately reinforce prevailing gender stereotypes, and we also believe, much
like the marriage proposals discussed earlier, emphasizing care work will ultimately
lead to public policies designed to facilitate women's work in the home without
substantially changing the gender dynamics of the home or the workplace, in which
case it is difficult to see how these proposals benefit women.
49. Id. at 117.
50. See ANN CRITTENDEN, TIlE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WIlY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN TIlE
WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 87-93 (2001).
51. Id. at 235.
52. Id. at 258-68. Crittenden does include some proposals that would enable women to spend
more time in the paid labor market, including universal preschool for three and four year-olds,
although preschools are often available only for half days. Id. at 263-65.
53. For additional arguments, see EVA FEDER KITAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUAL-
ITY, AND DEPENDENCY (1999); NANCY FOLIRF, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VAL-
UES (2001); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997).
54. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feninism, Law and Desire,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183-97 (2001) (critiquing emphasis on care work because it privileges
motherhood); JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE TIlE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST JURISPRU-
DENCE 39-55 (1999) (equating care work with the "difference" school of feminism); Mary Anne
Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the
Burden of Care for Children Should be Shifted, 76 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 1753 (2001) (questioning
the justification for treating children as a public responsibility).
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The care work literature is misleading in several important respects. First, the
literature is premised on the notion that most women are unable to balance the
demands of work and family and thus are forced to choose between the two, with
a further implication that women are dropping out of the workforce in significant
numbers to care for their children. But, as we know, this is not an accurate picture;
the majority of married women with children, even those who are very young, are
in the workforce and only a relatively small percentage of women exit the workforce
after having children. Nor is this a recent phenomenon: by the mid-1980s. more
than half of mothers with children under two years of age were in the workforce. 55
Even so, during the last two decades, women with children under the age of three
nearly doubled their workforce participation rates, rising from 33% in 1975 to
63% in 2000.56 Most of these women are working full-time--only about a third of
women work part-time, and the percentages of those working part-time are roughly
the same for women with children and those without children. 57
These general figures were confirmed in a recent survey of women working
more than twenty hours a week, which found substantial continued labor force
attachment among women following the birth of a child.58 Among the survey
population, only about 16% of the women failed to return to the labor force within
twelve months of giving birth, 59 a rate, the authors noted, that was comparable to
nonchildbearing women. 60 The study also found that mothers experiencing their
first births did not substantially differ in their labor force behavior from mothers
who already had children. 6 1 Significantly, the authors found that job turnover for
women was reduced most effectively by extending leave periods and reducing
overtime hours rather than through flexible work practices such as part-time work.
With respect to the latter, the authors concluded, "We believe that reduced work
options, such as part-time work, were often accompanied by such serious reduc-
tions in autonomy, upward mobility, benefits, and pay that they did not appeal to
most new mothers." 62
One explanation for the misleading focus on women exiting the workforce to
care for their children is that it is often assumed that all of the women who are not
55. See Jacob Alex Klerman & Arleen Leibowitz, Child Care and Women's Return to Work
After Childbirth, AM. ECON. REv., May 1990, at 284, 284.
56. See Marisa DiNatale & Stephanie Boraas, The Labor Force Experience of Womenfrom
"Generation X", MONT1HY LAB. REV., Mar. 2002, at 3, 9.
57. In a recent article, Professor Anne Alstott presented the following statistics: at every
income level but the lowest (under $10,000) more mothers work full-time than part-time, and in
the year 2000, 54% of mothers worked full-time while 27% were not working, and 16% worked
part-time. Anne Alstott, Limited Options, BOSTON REv., Feb./March 2002, at 15-16 n.4, avail-
able at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR27. 1/alstott.html.
58. See Jennifer L. Glass & Lisa Riley, Family Responsive Policies and Employee Retention
Following Childbirth, 76 Soc. FORCES 1401, 1417 (1998). The study was based on an interview
sample of 324 women who were employed more than twenty hours a week during their third
trimester, and the respondents were recruited from hospitals in Indiana. Although the sample is
neither large nor geographically diverse, the results of the study largely replicate previous stud-
ies, and is used here as an example rather than as definitive proof.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1426 (citing Jacob Klerman & Arlene Leibowitz, Explaining Changes in Married
Mothers' Employment Over Time, 32 DEMOGRAIIy 365 (1995)).
61. Id. at 1424.
62. Id. at 1426.
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in the paid labor force have chosen that path in order to care for their children. It is
worth noting, therefore, that many women remain out of the workforce both before
and after they have children, and it is not the presence of children that explains
their decision. Indeed, there is a core group, which represents roughly 20% of the
working-age female population, that is never in the workforce, and a smaller group
of women exit the labor force for significant periods of time after having chil-
dren.6 3
There is also a distinct classist element that underlies much of the care work
literature, one that fails to acknowledge the ways in which most women are able to
achieve some balance between their home and work responsibilities. Much of the
literature, and this is particularly true of Harrington and Crittenden, is focused on
the demands faced by professionals-most often lawyers, journalists, and profes-
sors--demands that frequently involve the high costs of child care, or the difficul-
ties of working with intransigent elderly relatives. 64 If it were not for the obses-
sive preoccupation with female professionals in the caretaking literature, it would
be entirely unnecessary to note that most women are not working the sixty hour
weeks that are common for some lawyers, and most are not spending upwards of
$1000 a month on child care. The high cost of child care is often said to justify
women's exit from the labor force when they have children, but there is little em-
pirical support for this argument. For example, more than 40% of child care is
provided by relatives, generally at little or no cost, and this practice is particularly
common among low-wage earners. 65 A recent survey by the Census Bureau found
that the average cost of care provided through institutional settings was $326 per
month, certainly not an insignificant amount but generally not so high as to justify
women's exit from the labor market, particularly given that only about 20% of
child care is provided through institutional settings.66
63. It is conceivable that some significant portion of women exit the workforce upon mar-
riage in anticipation of having children. While we do not have any data documenting this be-
havior, even if it were true, it would seem more likely that the behavior was attributable to
gender ideology relating to traditional families rather than to the anticipated presence of chil-
dren.
64. Mona Harrington, for example, describes the experiences of a female professor with a job
in Oregon, who had to relocate for some time to care for her elderly father, who was extremely
difficult to deal with. HARRINGTON, supra note 44. While the situation sounded unpleasant, it
obviously has little relevance to most people's lives, as this was a family where the woman was
able to take an extended leave of absence from what is a high-esteem and flexible job, appar-
ently without pay, to move across country to care for her father, who was financially self-suffi-
cient. The difficulties the woman faced were largely due to her father's cantankerousness, an
issue that public support for caretaking is not likely to remedy.
Professor Peggie Smith observes that the conflict between caretaking responsibilities and
work "is particularly acute for low-income single parents, who typically hold jobs that lack
flexibility and provide few, if any, benefits. Whereas dual-income couples with children may
experience work-parenting conflicts that are simply disruptive inconveniences, similar conflicts
can devastate low-income single parents." Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental
Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001
Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1453-54 (footnote omitted).
65. See HARRINGTON, supra note 44, at 31-35. A 1996 survey by the United States Depart-
ment of Education found lower rates of relative care for preschoolers, with just over 30% of
those in nonparental arrangements being cared for by a relative. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, DIGEST OF STATISTICS 1996, at tbl.47 (1997), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/
d96/D96TO47.html.
66. See KRISTIN SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO'S MINDING THE KIDS? CHILD CARE ARRANGE-
MENTS: SPRING 1997, at 14 (2002), available at www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-86.pdf.
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Moreover, whatever overtime workers are putting in tends to compensate for
the lack of substantial wage gains they have obtained over the last decade. Indeed,
a better balance between work and family demands could be achieved through the
development of a living wage, one that would free both men and women to spend
more time outside of the paid labor market, accompanied by a generous benefits
plan.6 7 And ultimately, it is women at the bottom, not the top, of the income scales
who should be the focus of policy initiatives, those who have the fewest not the
most choices.
We do not mean to suggest that the costs of childcare are unproblematic, or
that balancing the demands inside and outside of the home is easy to achieve.
Obviously, the high cost of much child care substantially burdens many families
and deserves serious public attention in the form of greater public subsidies. What
we mean to suggest is that the costs of child care rarely cause, or justify, women to
exit the labor force, nor is it the case that it is impossible to achieve some reason-
able balance-which is generally contrary to the picture drawn by much of the
existing literature.
Not only does the focus on care work often provide a misleading picture of the
complicated relationship between paid labor and unpaid care work, but there is
little reason to believe that the various policy proposals advocated by the authors
would substantially increase women's life choices. Much of the recent writing on
care work looks to France as a model of a nation that provides extensive public
support for childrearing, including free nursery schools and generous child allow-
ances. 68 While the public support system in France, as is true in much of Europe,
is impressive, and certainly far more extensive than what is found in the United
States, from the perspective of gender equality, France appears to be at best an
imperfect model for adoption. Indeed, on all of the various economic indicators of
equality, French women are on par or fall behind their American counterparts.
Depending on the figures that are used, the labor force participation rates in the
two countries are quite similar, as is the wage gap,69 though women dominate the
part-time sector to a greater extent in France, occupying 85% of the part-time jobs
and relatedly constituting 80% of workers earning under $600 per month.70 Women
also hold a slightly higher percentage of executive management positions in the
67. As Peggie Smith notes, "[w]hile part-time work is a favored strategy to help professional
employees cope with work and parenting conflicts, studies indicate that workplace flexibility is
especially crucial for low-income workers with children." Smith, supra note 64, at 1454 (foot-
notes omitted).
68. See, e.g., CRITTENDEN, supra note 50, at 264-67; Mary Becker, Caring for Children and
Caretakers, 76 Ctu.-KNT L. REV. 1495, 1502-05 (2001); Foi BRE, supra note 53, at 131-34.
69. The data on the wage gap in France vary considerably depending on the particular mea-
sure that is used, and on some scales, French women fare substantially better than American
women. A recent comprehensive survey indicated that among full-time workers during 1996,
the wage gap in France was .8999 based on net earnings, whereas on a slightly different mea-
sure, the United States gap was .763. Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Gender Differ-
ences in Pay, 14 J. oF- ECON. PERSP. 75, 92 (2000). Other estimates show a smaller gap between
the two countries. See FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., TIlE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN AND WORK 353
tbl.l1.4 (1998) (reporting a 1993 wage gap in France of .81 with a gap in 1994 for the United
States of .76).
70. Dominique Meda, Women and Work, at www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/wom-work.asp
(last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
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United States (5.1%) than they do in France (4.7%),71 and according to data com-
piled by the United Nations, American women occupy a substantially higher per-
centage of high level government jobs (33.1% to 10.8% in 1996),72 and hold a
slightly higher number of positions in the elected branch of government. 73 Per-
haps most significantly, France's vast public support system has done little to alter
gender inequality in the home. A 1998-99 poll found that French women per-
formed 80% of domestic chores, 74 again, a substantially higher percentage than
for American married women who tend to perform two to three times as much as
their husbands. A recent comparison between the limited British public welfare
state and the extensive French system led two authors to conclude, "the wide-
spread availability of state child-care facilities in France seem to have done little
to create a more equal gender division of childcare, or indeed of domestic or com-
munity work. ' 75
It might be objected that these figures provide a misleading impression of
women's well-being in France insofar as they are limited to comparisons with men
in the workplace. In her comments at the conference where this paper was pre-
sented and in a recent article, Mary Becker correctly noted that French women
experience far lower degrees of poverty than their American counterparts, which
she attributed to the more extensive state support available in France for moth-
ers. 76 This observation raises two important questions, one perhaps more funda-
mental than the other. On the more methodological level, our response is that the
lower poverty levels evident in France are not the product of the state support
71. See LINDA WIRTH, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, BREAKING THROUGH THE GLASS
CEILING: WOMEN IN MANAGEMENT 38, 41 (2001); see also Dora L. Costa, From Mill Town to
Board Room: The Rise of Women's Paid Labor, 14 J. EcON. PERSP. 101, 114 (2000) ("Although
comparisons of women's success in business are harder to make across countries, the available
data suggest that women in the United States fare relatively well."); Erik Olin Wright & Janeen
Baxter, The Gender Gap in Workplace Authority: A Cross-National Study, 60 AM. Soc. REV. 407,
420-21 (1995) (in a cross-national study, the United States and Australia consistently ranked the
highest on women's workplace authority measures).
72. DIVISION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, UNITED NATIONS FACT SHEET ON WOMEN IN
GOVERNMENT (1996), at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/percent.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2002).
73. Neither the United States nor France ranked especially high in their percentage of elected
leaders, with the United States at 56th place at 14% of its lower house and 13% of the upper
chamber, while France was listed at 61st with 12.3% and 10.9% respectively. INTER-PARLIAMEN-
TARY UNION, WOMEN IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS (2002), at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm
(last visited Oct. 17, 2002). These numbers remained roughly the same following the most
recent elections: 59 of the 435 (13.6%) seats in the United States House are occupied by women,
with 14 women in the Senate. See Mary Lynn Jones, Year of the Woman? That Remains 1992,
CHI TRIB., Nov. 13, 2002, at 7. In France, 70 of the 555 seats (12.6%) in the French Parliament
are held by women. See Alan Covell, Chirac, Riding High, Reappoints His Prime Minister,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at A9.
74. Meda, supra note 70.
75. Abigail Gregory, Women's Work in Britain and France: Insights for a Wider Understand-
ing of Women's Work 14 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
76. Mary Becker, supra note 40, at 105-10 (2002). Becker writes: "In France, families with
children receive many supports from the state, with the result that although child poverty rates
are about equal in France and the United States prior to governmental supports ... after govern-
mental supports, only 5.7% of French children remained poor whereas 21% of American chil-
dren remained poor." Id. at 105 (footnote omitted); see also Karen Christopher, Family-Friendly
Europe, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 8, 2002, at 59 (discussing poverty rates for women and children).
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systems available to mothers but are rather a product of the much more extensive
French social welfare state, as well as the more centralized wage-setting role the
state plays in France which has led to lower levels of income inequality for both
men and women. 77 Not only does the United States have higher levels of poverty
than most other industrialized countries, but it also has the highest per capita in-
come, a fact that reflects the United States tolerance for higher levels of income
inequality and resistance to state intervention as a means of reducing that inequal-
ity.78 An extensive statistical analysis of the gender wage gap across countries
found that institutional wage setting structures played a significant role in the level
of women's wages: women tended to have greater wage parity in countries with
less inequality across incomes and more centralized wage setting structures.79 The
wage structure in the United States is defined as highly decentralized with high
levels of income inequality, which may explain why the wage gap in the United
States appears larger than in many other countries. 80 Similarly, a cross-national
survey found little correlation between state support of the family through various
forms of subsidies and the welfare of women. 81 As Karen Christopher has re-
cently noted, the countries with the two lowest poverty rates among single mothers
worldwide-Finland and Sweden-also have the highest employment rates among
single women, and employment at decent wage levels. 82
But on the more fundamental level, there is the difficult question of how we
measure women's well-being-should we consider women better off in France
because their burden of caretaking is lessened through extensive public support
even if that support has not empowered women either in the paid labor force or in
the home? As the data indicate, women in France seem to have fewer economic
choices than American women, although it is also possible that the greater public
support caretaking receives in France has lessened the need to seek power and
autonomy outside of the home, 83 a fact that may be consistent with the goals of the
caretaking literature. This seems to us a limited objective and one that too will-
ingly accepts the gendered division of labor despite the effects that division has on
women's autonomy or power. Making women's work less onerous seems far less
77. For a helpful discussion of these differences, see Seymour Martin Lipset, Still the Excep-
tional Nation?, WILSON Q., Winter 2000, at 31.
78. Id. at 38 ("A 1996 survey shows that a policy that reduces income disparities is supported
by less than one-third (28 percent) of Americans, while positive responses elsewhere range from
42 percent in Austria to 82 percent in Italy.").
79. Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Wage Structure and Gender Earnings Differen-
tials: an International Comparison, ECONOMICA, May 1996, at S29, S30. The study did not
include France but it did include a number of other similarly situated European countries, in-
cluding Germany and Italy.
80. Id.
81. Ann Orloff, Gender in the Welfare State, 22 ANN. REV. Soc. 51 (1996).
82. Christopher, supra note 76, at 60. Christopher also notes that raising employment rates is
insufficient to reduce poverty, rather, it is essential that the United States provide good jobs for
single mothers. Id. at 61.
83. For commentary on women and power in the household, see Naomi Cahn, The Power of
Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177 (2000).
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important a goal than changing the nature of the choices available to women84 and
to men. Indeed, rather than seeking to improve women's material conditions with-
out challenging the existing gender order, it is crucial to find ways to improve
economic conditions while disrupting gender subordination. 8 5
One reason extensive state support has not substantially improved women's
equality is that gender ideologies, particularly surrounding childrearing, have re-
mained stubbornly resistant to change, even in the face of extensive public policies
designed to facilitate childrearing. The strongest predictor of whether a woman is
likely to be in the labor market, before or after she has children, is her gender
ideology-those women who hold traditional views about the role of women are
substantially more likely to be out of the labor market than those who have more
egalitarian views regarding childrearing and family income. Polls continue to dem-
onstrate preference for maternal care. In one recent poll, more than 40% of women
believed it was best for a child to have a mother at home, 86 and a Washington Post
poll several years ago indicated that 40% of the respondents had a nostalgic long-
ing for the traditional model of a male breadwinner with a stay-at-home wife. 87
Other polls purport to demonstrate greater progress on the evolution of our social
norms; the percentage of respondents in a Gallup poll who indicated that preschool
aged children suffered if their mother worked declined from more than 70% to
33% in the last two decades. 88 Although this figure may appear low, it is worth
noting that it is slightly higher than the number of women who remain out of the
labor force.
Even when parents share responsibilities, they generally do not completely
escape traditional gender patterns; in his study of shared parenting, Scott Coltrane
found that women remained much "more likely to do laundry, plan meals, arrange
for babysitters, and mop, while men remained more likely to take out the trash and
do household repairs."'89 Even when working class couples work split shifts, and
84. It is interesting to note that the debate currently occurring in the United States was played
out in a very similar fashion in the 1920s and 1930s in both Britain and France. At the time,
many feminists opposed the child allowances as reifying women's role in the home at the ex-
pense of women's participation in the labor force. British social reformer and feminist Eleanor
Rathbone argued against fighting for equal access to jobs and equal pay and in favor of "valuing
and paying women for their work as wives and mothers." Joya Misra, Mothers or Workers? The
Value of Women's Labor: Women and the Emergence of Family Allowance Policy, 12 GENDER &
Soc'Y 376, 381-82 (1998). In France, where family allowances among private employers dates
to the nineteenth century, tensions existed among pronatalists who saw family allowances as a
means to increasing the birth rate and keeping women out of the workforce, while feminists,
aided by the Catholic church, sought to support family allowances and equal pay for equal work
as a way of recognizing the importance of motherhood and satisfying the needs of working-class
women. Id. at 390.
85. Orloff, supra note 81, at 69 (relying on Guy Molyneux, Mobilization Without Emancipa-
tion? Women's Interests, the State and Revolution in Nicaragua, 11 FEMINIST STUD. 227 (1985)).
86. HARRINGTON, supra note 44, at 113.
87. Richard Morin & Megan Rosenfeld, With More Equity, More Sweat, WASH. POST, Mar.
22, 1998, at Al (reporting that "4 in 10 of those surveyed said, it would be better to return to the
gender roles of the 1950s").
88. Costa, supra note 71, at 116 (noting that by 1991 only 34% of poll respondents believed
that preschool children suffer if a mother works).
89. Naomi Cahn, The Coin of the Realm: Poverty and the Commodification of Gendered
Labor, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 7 (2001). ScoTr COLTRANE, FAMILY MAN: FATHERHOOD,
HOUSEWORK, AND GENDER EQUITY 65-66 tbl.3.1 (1996).
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men are solely responsible for children while their wives work, men still tend to
cede responsibility to their wives as soon as they return home because of the men's
perceptions of the gendered nature of child care.90 The ideology remains tradi-
tional, even though the reality of worksharing is somewhat egalitarian. 9 1
Ideological expressions of a preference for maternal care, however, does not
mean that women would likewise prefer to provide maternal care if that means
having to leave the workforce. This is one area where the care work literature
feeds into old gender stereotypes, despite its intentions to the contrary.
This highlights another important limitation of the care work literature, par-
ticularly as it relates to its theoretical underpinning. If the care work literature
fails to capture the empirical reality of women's attachment to the labor market,
then it appears to be based on a normative rather than a positive foundation. Im-
plicit in the literature that emphasizes facilitating women's work in the home is the
notion that women would prefer to be devoting more time to care work, and less
time to their labor market activities, which also implies that women value care
work over paid labor market work. We have stated that this assumption is implicit
in the literature because most of those advocating greater attention to care work
disavow, often heatedly, any consideration of care work as women's work, or that
women are by nature caretaking, and instead, seek to focus on the reality that
women continue to bear disproportionate responsibility for care work. But it is the
solutions and policy proposals that reveal a preference for care work, all of which
are designed to facilitate, or accommodate, care work outside of the labor market
rather than to lighten the burden of care work so as to enable women to devote
more time to paid wage work. This is true of the proposals for public subsidies,
part-time jobs, more flexible workplaces, restriction on working hours, and even
paid leave provisions. Given that all of the authors disclaim a belief that care work
is women's work, these proposals appear to be targeted more at benefiting depen-
dents rather than women, and in this respect we find a parallel with the marriage
proposals, which are likewise designed with the best interests of children in mind.
Instead, emphasizing the importance of care work to women, and its status as
a public good, suggests that women do, and should, privilege care work over their
paid market work, and in this way, the theory from the left on care work begins to
resemble the marriage promotion proposals on the right. This analogy should not
be overplayed, as there are obvious and important differences between the two
perspectives, with the primary difference stemming from the importance of het-
erosexual marriage and its corresponding ideology to the marriage proposals,
whereas the left emphasizes the importance of supporting care work in a way that
is not dependent on a male breadwinner. At the same time, the proposals of the left
carry many of the same dangers and stigmas as those flowing from the right.
IV. MOVING FORWARD
Where does this leave us? We suggest that rather than stressing the impor-
tance and value of care work, we should focus our efforts on three particular areas
90. FRANCINE M. DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: How EQUALLY SHARED PARENTING WORKS 171-73
(1999).
91. Beverly H. Burris, Employed Mothers: The Impact of Class and Marital Status on the
Prioritizing of Family and Work, 72 Soc. Sc. Q. 50, 63 (1991); see generally Francine M.
Deutsch & Susan E. Saxon, Traditional Ideologies, Nontraditional Lives, 38 SEX ROLES 331
(1998).
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as a way of seeking to enhance the life choices of women. These areas are educa-
tion as both a means to provide more economic choices to women and of chipping
away at the prevailing gender stereotypes; restructuring the school day and school
year to accommodate wage labor, rather than concentrating solely on restructuring
the workplace; and finally, rethinking the ways in which workplace discrimination
continues to limit women's opportunities. 92
A. Education
Without question, education remains the strongest vehicle for increasing
women's life choices, as education provides the best means out of poverty and the
greatest market opportunities. Women with college degrees or beyond have a la-
bor force participation rate of 86%, while only 55% of women without high school
degrees are in the labor force. 9 3 There is likewise a sharp and well documented
wage premium associated with increasing education levels: women with college
degrees earn approximately 45% more than women who have obtained a high
school degree and about 35% more than women with some college education. 94
The substantially higher wages associated with higher levels of education undoubt-
edly enhance women's economic power while providing a greater array of choices,
often including the choice of full-time motherhood given that higher status women
tend to marry higher status men.
Women already outpace men in educational attendance and achievement, but
with fewer than 30% of the population holding college degrees,95 there is still
wide room for growth. Currently about 65% of women enter college within two
years of graduating from high school, and about two-thirds of those women enter a
four-year college. However, only about 30% will ultimately earn a college degree,
while many others will opt for a two-year associate degree or leave without obtain-
ing any degree at all.96
Obtaining a college degree provides a particularly important advantage for
women compared to their male counterparts because women face a sharply limited
low-skill market, whereas among male-dominated positions there are still well-
92. We recognize that there are additional options for reconciling caretaking and equality in
the workplace for women, for example, Smith, supra note 64, at 1447; see also, Selmi, supra
note 40; but we focus on these as the most important both practically and symbolically.
• 93. See DiNatale & Boraas, supra note 56, at 5. For men the difference in participation rates
is not nearly as dramatic: 95% of men with college degrees participate in the labor force com-
pared to 86% who do not have high school degrees. Id. at 6.
94. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2000/2001, at 149 (2001) (data
are for 1999). For additional analysis on the wage premium for higher education see UNITED
STATES CENSUS BUREAU, THE BIG PAYOFF: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SYNTHETIC ESTIMATES OF
WORK-LIFE EARNINGS 3-5 (2002).
95. Given that educational levels differ significantly by generation, with substantially higher
levels of education among younger age groups, educational attainment levels are typically bro-
ken down by specific age groups. Based on data from the Current Population survey, 28.2% of
those aged twenty-five to twenty-nine years old have attained a bachelor's degree, with similar
percentages for those up to fifty-four years old, after which the figures drop significantly. See
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2000). Among
the twenty-five to twenty-nine age cohort, 29.5% of women and 26.8% of men had attained at
least a bachelor's degree. See id. at 3.
96. See DiNatale & Boraas, supra note 56, at 3 (noting that "in 2000, 30 percent of women




paying careers available for high school graduates, though the number of such
positions is decreasing with each passing year. Again, the data are revealing: in
1999, one third of women were in jobs paying poverty-level wages compared to
20% of men, and women with less than a high school education earned $2.39 less
per hour than their male counterparts. 97 African-American and Latina women
stand to benefit the most from increasing their education levels, since they tend to
be concentrated in the lowest rungs of the low-wage sector and will therefore re-
ceive the strongest wage boost from obtaining higher levels of education.
Education, of course, is no guarantee of equality, and even highly-educated
women continue to face workplace barriers while confronting the many difficul-
ties of balancing their work and family demands. At the same time, enhancing the
educational attainment of women remains the best means for achieving greater
equality and choices, and higher levels of education are also associated with more
progressive views on issues involving gender equity. Relatedly, there is a strong
negative relationship between single-parenthood and education, so increasing the
focus on education should lead to a decrease in single-parenthood. 9 8 Thus, if we
are truly concerned about the welfare of women, we should be providing more
public support for college education, rather than trying to marry women off or
support their care work in the home.
Another aspect of the focus on education involves gender equity within edu-
cation. If math and computer classes are filled mostly with boys, occupations that
rely on such skills will likewise remain dominated by men. The converse is also
true: so long as girls "choose" other courses, their career paths are likely to be
limited, thus frustrating the possibility of achieving workplace quality.
B. Restructuring School Days
As noted earlier, restructuring the workplace around parental norms occupies
a central place in the care work literature. These proposals have a strong appeal on
many levels though there are substantial questions regarding how they might im-
pact women's concerns relating to power and autonomy, and whether they are in
the least bit feasible. It is worth noting that that many European countries have far
more extensive part-time sectors, and nowhere do we find a robust part-time mar-
ket in which workers are not penalized in either wages or promotional opportuni-
ties for working part-time. Equally clear, wherever an extensive part-time market
has been implemented, part-time work is almost exclusively women's work. 99 With
respect to the part-time sector in the Netherlands, generally considered the most
97. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 94, at 149, 155 tbl.2.19, 156 tbl.2.20.
98. Francine D. Blau et al., Understanding Young Women's Marriage Decisions: The Role of
Labor and Marriage Market Conditions, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 624, 634 (2000) (describ-
ing "the well-known negative relationship between single-parenthood and education").
99. Within Europe, the Netherlands has created the most substantial part-time labor force,
and women tend to dominate the sector, with more than two-thirds of employed women working
part-time, as well as 95% of employed mothers of young children. See EILEEN APPELBAUM ET AL.,
SHARED WORK, VALUED CARE: NEW NORMS FOR ORGANIZING MARKET WORK AND UNPAID WORK 17
(2002). This study was sympathetic to the development of part-time work as a way of allowing
women to balance their competing demands, but its survey of European countries concluded
that substantial number of well-paying and meaningful part-time jobs was still lacking in all
countries. See id. at 17-19.
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extensive in Europe, Joel Handler has observed:
There has been a huge spread of part-time work: nine out of ten jobs created in
the last ten years has been part-time. Now more than a third of all jobs are part-
time, and nearly three-quarters of part-time workers are women. Part-time jobs
mean employment insecurity, low wages, no career, and no independence from
men.
Perhaps most significantly, up to 40% of part-time workers within the Netherlands
would prefer to work longer hours. 100
Rather than focusing solely on restructuring the workplace, we emphasize the
need for restructuring the school day to make it more compatible with full-time
work. The structure of the school day has not advanced significantly from a time
when women were at home waiting their child's arrival, and indeed, the schedule
still largely presumes that an adult (generally a woman) will be available by mid-
afternoon to assume care of a school-aged child.10 1 To ensure efficient use of
school transportation, schools often start and end at different times for different
grade levels-frequently beginning very early in the morning-with correspond-
ing ending times, and these staggered schedules make it even more difficult for
parents to combine work and their children's schooling.
In terms of accommodating working parents, a school day that is longer than
the workday would be the best option, although such a lengthy day may be too
difficult on many children and would surely be opposed on this ground. 102 Con-
tinuing the school day until later in the afternoon would be helpful; alternatively
providing more publicly-funded after-school programs would also provide some
accommodation for working parents. Publicly-financed full-day preschool and
daycare would also be necessary to enable women to have a more continuous labor
force attachment. To be sure, extending the school day, and the age at which pub-
lic education becomes available, would be enormously costly, but no more so than
the costs of the many proposals advanced by care work advocates. Moreover,
extended school days would offer significant benefits to many children, particu-
larly if the publicly provided care was of high quality. 103 We want to emphasize,
however, that the benefits these policies might provide to children are of second-
ary importance, and our focus is on developing policies that would be best for
women. Although the interests of women and children are certainly not mutually
exclusive, and we should be concerned about any policies that would obviously be
harmful to children, it is also the case that their interests are not always coexten-
100. See Joel F. Handler, The "Third Way" of the Old Way?, 48 KAN. L. REV. 765, 777 (2000).
There are certainly many examples of companies that have created good part-time jobs, some of
which are detailed in the Appelbaum report cited above. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 99. But
these examples all remain isolated and those who advocate expanding the part-time sector must
explain why we should expect those jobs to be meaningful rather than marginalized, which has
been by far the most common kind of part-time job to date.
101. In a recent article, Judy Heymann observed, "We have school days and calendars that
matched the agrarian work cycle; we should update them to match parents' industrial and
postindustrial work schedule and children's increasing need for high-level skills." Jody Heymann,
Can Working Families Ever Win? Helping Parents Succeed at Work and Caregiving, BOSTON
REV., Feb./Mar. 2002, at 4, 13.
102. It is worth noting that for many children in daycare a day that begins before and ends
after the typical workday is already the norm.
103. See Becker, supra note 40, at 68-69 (noting "mounting evidence that children in quality




sive either-what is good for children will not always be good for women, and
when a conflict arises, as may be the case with a longer school day, we should be
attentive to policies that benefit children at the expense of women's labor force
activity. A final advantage to restructuring the school day is that such a proposal is
more consistent with the emphasis in the caretaking literature on the public re-
sponsibility for children, insofar as the restructuring occurs in the public sphere of
state-financed education rather than in the traditionally private sphere of the work-
place.
By emphasizing the advantages to restructuring the school day, we do not
mean to exclude workplace reforms, and indeed, we believe that reforming both
sectors would prove the optimal solution. Providing parents with more flexible
work schedules, including allowing parents dedicated time to participate in their
children's education, would help alleviate some of the current burden shouldered
by women trying to balance the often conflicting demands in and outside of the
paid labor market. This might be done by increasing the flexibility of sick leave,
or by allowing a certain number of days of leave, other than vacation, without any
restrictions on their use. However, the important point here is that the focus of
reform should not be on deemphasizing the workplace role of women.
C. The Continued Importance of Discrimination
Another limitation with the focus on women's lives outside of the workplace
as caretakers or marriage partners is that such a focus can easily overlook continu-
ing issues of workplace equity, or may suggest that these issues are no longer of
substantial importance. Indeed, lost in the debate over care work has been the
continued impact of workplace discrimination on women's lives. Although there
remains concern regarding the effect of sexual harassment in the workplace, far
less attention has been devoted to the pervasiveness of other forms of discrimina-
tion that limits women's opportunities and likely shapes their attitudes toward their
work. For a variety of reasons, including discrimination, women continue to be
excluded from vast segments of the labor market-a labor market that in the United
States remains highly segregated on the basis of gender. 104
In the last decade, there have been a series of large class action cases alleging
sex discrimination that have revealed institutional discrimination involving inten-
tional overt discrimination, much of which involves discrimination based on ste-
reotypes or notions of male dominance that we often mistakenly associate with an
earlier era. These cases have been filed against some of the largest corporations in
America, including Home Depot, Wal-Mart, Mitsubishi, State Farm, Merrill Lynch
and many other brokerage houses, as well as a whole series of suits against many
of the largest grocery store chains in the country including, Safeway, Lucky's, and
104. See Selmi, supra note 40, at 736-37 (discussing high levels of occupational segregation
and their relation to the wage gap).
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Publix Markets. 105 Most of these cases have been based on stereotypical attitudes
regarding women's abilities and interests.
In the case against Home Depot, for example, women were typically assigned
to work on cash registers rather than on the sales floor from which promotions
were made. 106 The company argued that its hiring practices were based on women's
interests and experience, a defense borrowed directly from the notorious case against
Sears that began in the early 1970s, 107 while the plaintiffs contended that it was
the defendants' beliefs about women's abilities and interests that determined its
hiring patterns. The grocery store litigation demonstrated similar patterns of in-
tentional discrimination with women being assigned to newer departments such as
the bakeries and delicatessens, while men worked in the more traditional depart-
ments such as meat and produce, which again proved to be the source of most of
the promotional opportunities. The cases against the brokerage industry, as well as
the series of sexual harassment cases, likewise involved overt intentional discrimi-
nation in what were male-dominated industries that saw women more as sexual
opportunities than colleagues. For all of these cases, there was nothing subtle or
even indirect about the discrimination; rather, they all raised claims of intentional
overt discrimination that had the effect of severely limiting women's job opportu-
nities-the very same kind of claims that have formed a substantial portion of
discrimination allegations going back to the early 1970s. 10 8
Another example of the pervasiveness of gender discrimination is provided in
a report coauthored by Joan Williams and Nancy Segal on discrimination against
working parents. 109 Williams and Segal document a series of cases in which par-
ents have challenged workplace practices that distinguish between workers with
and without family responsibilities. Among their examples are lawsuits involving
an employer who deliberately excluded married women as well as women with
children from initial employment, 110 and an employer who refused to promote a
woman because he believed that she should stay home with her family. 1 As will
105. Many of these cases are discussed in Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The
Nature and Effect of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation (forthcoming TEXAS L.
REV. 2003). For additional discussions see Reed Abelson, Can Respect be Mandated? Maybe
Not Here, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, at C1 (discussing Mitsubishi harassment case and subse-
quent reform efforts); Krysten Crawford, Barnhart v. Safeway, THE RECORDER, Apr. 6, 1994, at 2
(the plaintiffs "alleged that Safeway consistently overlooked women when making management
promotions, assigned them to lower-paying jobs in the deli or bakery .... ); Kristen Grimsley,
Home Depot Settles Gender Bias Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1997, at D1; Anne Hull, A
Woman's Place, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at 1A (discussing case against Publix Mar-
kets); Susan E. Reed, Taking the Bull by the Horns, AMER. PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2000, at 35 (dis-
cussing suit against Merrill Lynch).
106. See Selmi, supra note 105, at 49-50.
107. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Although the case
was ultimately decided in the late 1980s, the suit itself began in the 1970s.
108. For several early discussions of the role of sex stereotyping, see CYNTHIA Fucils EPSTEIN,
WOMAN'S PLACE: OPrIONS AND LIMITS IN PROFESSIONAL CAREERS 152-66 (1970) (sex typing in
occupations); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451
(1978) (describing the role sex stereotyping plays in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
109. Joan Williams and Nancy Segal, The New Glass Ceiling: Mothers-and Fathers-Sue
for Discrimination (Aug. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Maine Law Review).




be apparent to anyone familiar with the doctrine, these cases resemble one of the
earliest gender discrimination cases to reach the Supreme Court, Phillips v. Mar-
tin-Marrietta Corp., 112 which involved discrimination faced by a woman with chil-
dren, but not a man. Both mothers and fathers face discrimination based on their
caregiving responsibilities, apart from any gender discrimination that women them-
selves also face.
These discriminatory practices impede not just individual women, but they
also reflect more widespread beliefs about gender and work, beliefs that underlie
the pro-marriage and pro-carework proposals. These proposals downplay the con-
tinued significance of discrimination in both limiting and shaping opportunities
for women, and instead see women's caretaking obligations as limiting, and in
some cases properly, their economic opportunities.
We believe it is important to comprehensively restructure market work and
carework so that women can spend time in both the workplace and with their chil-
dren. Our emphasis remains on equity and equality, rather than caring for chil-
dren; we begin with women's dual roles as workers and as caretakers and we seek
changes in both aspects of women's lives so that both caretaking and market work
are valued. 113 As such, we recognize the importance of various strands of carework
literature that link the devaluation of caretaking to women's poverty but we seek to
point out the dangers of the carework literature that focuses on rewarding upper-
middle-class women for staying home to take care of their children.
V. CONCLUSION
Finally, we want to address the lingering desire to have it all, and the profound
frustration that accompanies what has proved to be an elusive quest for having it
all. For example, part-time work offers the illusion of remaining in the workplace
while spending time at home. Instead, however, part-time workers typically have
fewer benefits and have generally taken themselves off of the same promotion
track as their full-time coworkers.
As much as we might like to believe otherwise, it is critical that we recognize
that we cannot have it all, and that very few people, men or women, are able to
attain all of their aspirations in both the home and the workplace. This is also true
for men-men who shirk their family responsibilities because of the amount of
time they spend in the workplace should not be seen as having it all. Instead, their
lives are limited by their devotion to the paid labor market and they forgo many of
the joys of family life. What we ought to be seeking is a semblance of balance, for
men and women, in the workplace and at home, one that will inevitably involve
compromises, imperfect options, and many frustrations, but one that will also lead
us to better policy choices designed to balance our needs rather than satisfy them
all. This semblance of balance necessitates a change in the valuation of work
within the home, but it also requires changes outside of the home and in the work-
place to enhance women's and men's life choices.
112. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
113. See Becker, supra note 40, at 60 ("We need to target both the cultural over-valuation of
masculine qualities and the cultural under-valuation of feminine qualities.").
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